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Abstract: This study investigates the impact of hierarchical jumps in the CEO’s succession on firms’ 
financial performance. To contemplate deeply, hierarchical jumps have been categorized 
into high and low level evaluating the positive impact of high-level hierarchical jump on 
firms’ performance. Moreover, this study has also formulated hierarchical intensity signi-
fying the idea that despite neglecting senior board members during hierarchical jumps, 
still marginal increment in the firms’ growth has been observed. Using panel regression 
technique along with 2sls instrumental regression, this research reveals that hierarchical 
jumps in CEOs successions are more conducive only if the incumbent CEOs are selected 
irrespective of age, degree or high hierarchical position within the hierarchical ladder. 
Lastly, this study enunciates that firms having high total assets boost their performance via 
hierarchical jumps emphatically.
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Introduction
Since the last few decades, researchers have been analysing the different aspects of 
corporate governance which do impact the firms’ performance. In this regard, the 
renowned upper echelon theory supports the concept that the characteristics and the 
ability of corporate governance influence the firms’ growth (Hambrick, 2007; Ham-
brick & Mason, 1984). A humble CEO and his/her top management team are found 
in the United States to be associated with stronger firm performance (Ou, Wald-
man, & Peterson, 2018). Fewer previous studies (Guerrero-Villegas, Giráldez-Puig, 
Pérez-Calero Sánchez, & Hurtado-González, 2018) have unveiled that the positive 
role of the board between government concentration and firms’ performance but the 
effect of the internal mechanism of the corporate board on firms’ performance still 
requires exploration (H. W. Hu, Tam, & Tan, 2010). 
Moreover, the intention of “upper echelon” also requires contemplation. In this 
regard, (Shen & Cannella Jr, 2002) have evaluated that “upper echelon” seek for 
authoritative power and this lust of power, sometimes causes hurdles for the incum-
bent CEO. Moreover, the circulation of power theory (Ocasio, 1994) reiterates that 
whenever the incumbent CEO executes orthodox strategies, the top management 
team confronts severely which causes his/her early departure. CEO succession 
occurs either regularly or irregularly and it influences the firms’ performance in 
either way. In this regard, some studies emphasize that CEO succession does not 
disturb the momentum of firms’ performance while (F. Hu & Leung, 2012) have 
alleged the CEO succession to be a hurdle for firms’ profitability. Significantly, 
firms can appoint the successor either internally or externally depending upon the 
economic condition. Previous literature has assured that outsider CEOs enhance 
the firms’ performance (He & Huang, 2011) but this type of succession is advanta-
geous for those firms which are seeking for versatility among products or requiring 
innovative amelioration.
Although the effect of CEO’s succession on firm performance has been extensive-
ly researched and these previous studies predominately employ the agency theory, 
much of them focus on firm financial performance and formal board structure, while 
neglecting the social performance aspect(McGuire, Dow, & Ibrahim, 2012) of infor-
mal hierarchy among directors on a firm’s board(He & Huang, 2011). Will hierarchi-
cal fluctuations/jumps in CEOs succession also escalate the firms’ performance? The 
answer requires theoretical formulation and empirical evidence.
Additionally, (Jiang, Huang, & Kim, 2013) have analysed non-routine turnover of 
CEO for Chinese firms concluding that high volatility firms always endorse the out-
sider CEO (by imposing forceful turnover on the predecessor). They have examined 
the high rate of succession among SOEs as compared to non-SOEs. Though some 
authors have also evaluated the positive relation of internal succession with the firm’s 
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growth (Zhang & Qu, 2016) but they have neglected the internal succession via hi-
erarchical jumps. Though simple types of the hierarchy have been already analysed 
which is considered to be necessary for firms’ growth (He & Huang, 2011). While the 
impact of hierarchical jumps among board members on performance still requires 
contemplation.
The impact of CEO succession via hierarchical jumps has not been still evaluat-
ed comprehensively. The objective of this research paper is to assess the impact of 
hierarchical jumps in CEO succession on firms’ performance. This study also con-
templates the age and education of the successors to conclude whether these specific 
characteristics are necessary for the firms’ profitability or not? Adhering to prior 
study (Zhu, Ye, Tucker, & Chan, 2016), hierarchical rank indicates the status and sig-
nificance of board members among Chinese firms. Through analysing hierarchical 
rank and internal succession1, this research has formulated the hierarchical jumps. 
Comprehensively, hierarchical jumps have been categorized into low and high-level 
hierarchical jumps. The caveat of this categorization is to judge whether upper or 
low-rank officials among board members are more efficient or not when they are 
appointed as a CEO (He & Huang, 2011). Further, the hierarchical intensity has been 
constructed which contemplates the scenario when the numbers of senior board 
members are neglected while appointing CEO through the hierarchical jumps.
 To summarize, this research contributes in several ways. Firstly, the formulation 
of a theoretical model for hierarchical jumps. Secondly, hierarchical jumps have been 
categorized into low and high level. Thirdly, the hierarchical intensity has also been 
constructed to evaluate the psychological aspect. Lastly, empirical models have been 
analysed while supporting the theoretical models.
Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development
Circulation of power theory describes the causes of CEO turnover. There are two main 
factors which lead to the early departure of the CEO. Firstly, due to the lack of cogent 
ideas, the CEO cannot execute innovative strategies which decelerate firms’ perfor-
mance quickly revealing his position vulnerable (Ocasio, 1994). Secondly, the potential 
of adaptability which signifies that if the CEO does not adapt himself to the dynamic 
environment of the organization then the opposition will challenge him which ultimate-
ly, escort him to the early turnover. The second significant theory is “Social Identity 
theory” (Hogg & Terry, 2000)which motivates individuals to achieve social status. This 
is why board members within organizational hierarchy always endeavour to achieve the 
apex of the top management team. Therefore, there can be an eruption of war between 
members of “upper echelon” after succession(Shen & Cannella Jr, 2002). The hierar-
chy among top management represents the status of board members(Zhu et al., 2016). 
Moreover, hierarchical distribution is also necessary for the firm’s growth (He & Huang, 
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2011). Though some researchers(Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 2000; Fitza, 2014; Manner, 
2010; Shen & Cannella Jr, 2002; Zhang & Qu, 2016) have reiterated that the attributes 
of CEOs are necessary for the firm’s performance, but the survival of the novel CEO 
relies on his interaction with top management members and among top management 
team whereas the role of independent directors is pivotal. The prior research (Nanda 
& Onal, 2016)has witnessed that their vigilant presence is necessary for boosting the 
firms’ growth. It has also been observed that under the surveillance of independent 
directors, top management turnover positively enhances the firms’ growth(Shen & Lin, 
2009). Meanwhile, they are the best alternative for the replacement of poor performer 
CEO. (Shah et al., 2019) study shows firm performance is boost due to hierarchical 
jumps. To summarize the above discussion, it can be assessed that hierarchical jumps 
in CEO succession should enhance the firms’ growth under the vigilant presence of 
independent directors. So, the first hypothesis is:
H1: The incumbent CEO via hierarchical jump enhances the firms’ growth
Successor Appointment via Low Hierarchical Order and Firm’s Performance
Hierarchy is necessary for acquiring suggestions from the senior and to keep balance 
among all board members. Oppositely, hierarchy disintegrates the top management 
team by lower, middle and the upper level. The members who are ranked lower in 
hierarchy always seek to move forward as compared to the high level. In some orga-
nization, it has been observed that hierarchical distribution invigorates the interaction 
among board members which boosts the firms’ performance (He & Huang, 2011). In 
Chinese culture, the hierarchical order is considered to be extremely significant and 
inspiring. One cannot imagine, even for Chinese state government meetings, seats 
are allocated according to the rank of officials (Zhu et al., 2016). Additionally, they 
have also analysed the hierarchical rank of independent directors which is found to 
be higher in Chinese listed companies indicating their importance in decision mak-
ing. One aspect of hierarchical rank has also been described by social psychologists 
who have evaluated the individuals’ behaviour to be dissimilar due to their different 
hierarchical position. Most importantly, the reason behind this distinct behaviour is 
owing to different motivational intensity for achieving reward (as high reward is re-
lated to the high-rank position) (Gerth & Wolff, 1950). According to the behavioural 
theory of motivation, reward stimulates the motivational potential (Fowles, 1987) 
whereas the dominant mood is assumed to reflect the strength of the underlying moti-
vational system-i.e., strong anxiety with a strong behavioral inhibition system (which 
causes to strengthen the ambition. In this connection, it is the ambition of every 
board member to move forward in the hierarchical ladder. Hierarchical positions 
can be categorized into high, middle and low (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001). Among 
this categorization, the low-rank board members are neglected severely (He & Huang, 
27Whether CEO Succession Via Hierarchical Jumps is Detrimental or Blessing in Disguise?...
2011).  Conclusively, this study has observed that the low-rank d board members are 
enthusiastic about elevating his position. For this reason, they work hard and always 
endeavour to provide innovative ideas to be applauded by the senior board members. 
Relevant to the above, due to the dynamic behaviour of low-rank board members, it can 
be evaluated that if high-rank board members are replaced by low-rank board members 
via hierarchical jumps, then firms’ growth will be accelerated vehemently. Conclusive-
ly, (Sarfraz et al., 2019) has concluded that medium hierarchical jumps invigorate the 
innovation but they have segregated the jumps into three categories (low, medium and 
high). In this regard, high hierarchical jumps should escalate the firms’ growth.
H2: High hierarchical jumps (low-rank board members) in CEO succession en-
hance the firm’s growth
Senior Deferred Officials and Firms’ Growth
Prior research has contemplated the significance of hierarchy for firms’ profitabili-
ty(He & Huang, 2011). Moreover, no one can deny, the pivotal role of the hierarchy 
while executing modern strategies(T. Chen, 2015). Hierarchical rank also indicates 
the authoritative power through the authority which is necessary for the promulgation 
of new rule and regulation within the organization.  In China, reliable power is highly 
significant, but researchers have observed that the intensity of reliable power dissim-
ilar among officials (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). In this regard, though 
board members of an organization are authoritative, the intensity of authority is man-
ifested through their hierarchical rank. Keeping this view in the same vein, among 
Chinese firms, the senior independent directors are mostly allocated at the higher 
rank position(Zhu et al., 2016)which indicates their significance and authority.  They 
can be replaced by the CEO during firms’ deceleration (Conyon & He, 2011). Sig-
nificantly, it is not necessary that in all Chinese firms, board members1are allocated 
according to seniority (through experience or education). Due to this reason, there is 
a chance of error while considering the hierarchical jump2. So, hierarchical intensity 
(interaction term of several board members neglected and the total number of the 
hierarchical position of a successor) has been formulated which clarifies that even 
though senior board members are neglected, the momentum of firms’ performance is 
not disturbed. So, the third hypothesis is given by
H3: Hierarchical intensity boosts the firms’ performance.
Methods and Data Description
All Chinese listed companies (listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange) 
has been selected for empirical analysis, but sample size contains only 2928 firms 
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(due to missing data problem) for the years 2012 to 2016. Those firms are selected 
which issue “A” share as it is considered that these firms are under high surveillance 
of foreign investors following(Zhang & Qu, 2016). This study has selected CSMAR 
and WIND data sources which have already been endorsed by many scholars(Jiang 
et al., 2013; Lo, Wong, & Firth, 2010; McGuinness, Vieito, & Wang, 2017; Xu, Chen, 
Xu, & Chan, 2016; Zhai & Wang, 2016; Zhang & Qu, 2016). CSMAR data Source 
has been preferred for the company’s financial data while hierarchical jump has been 
evaluated by analysing the company’s profile (Zhu et al., 2016).
Dependent Variables
The dependent variable is a performance which has been measured by a proxy ROA 
following (Fitza, 2014; Geletkanycz & Boyd, 2011; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Man-
ner, 2010; Zhang & Qu, 2016). Additionally, some authors (Dezsö & Ross, 2012) 
have endorsed Tobin’s Q to measure the performance of the firm while others have 
endorsed market to book ratio which is also a significant measure for determining 
the future performance of a firm (Daily et al., 2000). Moreover, some authors (Jiang 
et al., 2013) have preferred EBIT/TA as a proxy for the performance (via accounting 
returns) while others (Bauer, Guenster, & Otten, 2004) have already researched by 
selecting the net profit margin as a proxy for performance.
To encapsulate, there are several options for measuring performance, but every 
variable has its pros and cons (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Importantly, ROA is the 
best proxy which indicates the performance of corporate governance whereas ROI 
(Adjaoud, Zeghal, & Andaleeb, 2007) has also been selected as a second proxy for 
measuring performance.
Independent Variables
A hierarchical jump in CEO succession is a primary independent variable which has 
been formulated following two criteria. Firstly, there must be an internal succession. 
Secondly, the successor should belong to the board of directors for each firm. The 
previous research has revealed that among Chinese firms, the board of directors is 
listed according to the seniority and power status. So, if internal succession occurs 
then successor should be runner-up in the list (generally if Chairman is turned over 
then vice chairman will be the successor). Therefore, a hierarchical jump will be 
considered when any board member who is lower than runner-up will be appointed 
as a CEO forcefully. In this scenario, the dummy variable “hierarchical jumps” will 
be assigned value “1” (satisfying the criteria mentioned above) and any other type3 
of succession has been given “0” value. Mathematically hierarchical jumps are for-
mulated as 
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(a)
 (b)
In equation (a), “HJit+1” is the hierarchical jump which depends upon the previ-
ous year. Moreover, it constitutes low hierarchical jump and high hierarchical jumps 
which has been elaborated by equation (b), where “n.PR” is the number of positions 
in the rank of hierarchy. As “HJit+1” is the sum of “LHJit” and “HJit” which represents 
the lower and high hierarchical jumps (these are also dummy variables). Their values 
depend upon the first condition “0 < ISSC” which explains that internal succession has 
been occurred. The second condition “nPR < ML” indicates. the number of position in 
a rank less than the middle level4 represents the low hierarchical jump. Oppositely, if 
the hierarchical position in the rank is greater than middle level then it will be a high 
hierarchical jump in CEO succession (see, details in Appendix A).
Hierarchical Intensity
According to (Zhu et al., 2016) the hierarchical position among each company’s pro-
file indicates the authority of the upper echelon. So it means there must be a rule 
of seniority while allocating each board member on the hierarchical rank. In this 
scenario, if internal succession occurs forcefully, then many upper-rank board mem-
bers are willing to be preferred via low hierarchical jumps. The reason behind this, 
they have been manoeuvring for the last many years to obtain the top level (Shen 
& Cannella Jr, 2002). It has been observed that the novel successor confronts many 
uncertainties during his early stage. The existent non CEOs (seniors) are the actual 
opponents who can aggravate the already miserable plight. In such circumstances, it 
is significant to analyse the impact of hierarchical jumps in CEO succession while 
expropriating the rights of senior board members on financial performance which has 
been defined as hierarchical intensity. Mathematically, it is written as
(c)
(d) 
In equation (c) (NPH)it is the number of positions in the hiechay which has been 
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are formulated as  
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are formulated as  
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 = ∑ 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    such that       𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ∩ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0      (a) 
 
Where   𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = {
1   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0 < 𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠, 𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅 < 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿
0                                 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = {
1        𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0 < 𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,    𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅 𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿
0                              𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒                                                            (b) 
In equation (a),"HJit+1" is th  hierarchical jump which depends upon the previou
y ar. Moreov r, it constitutes low hierarchical jump and high hierarch cal jumps which has
been elaborated by equation (b), where "n.p R”.is the numbe  of positions in the rank of 
y. As"HJit+1” is the sum f"LHJit" and"HHJit"w ich epresents the lower and h gh
hierarchical jumps (these are also dummy vari bles). Their valu s depend upon th  first
  " 0 < Issc” which explains that internal succession has been occurr d. The second
condition “npR < ML” indicates. the number of position in a rank less than the middle level4
represents the low hi rarchical jump. Oppo tely, if the hierarchical position in the rank is
gre ter than middle level then it will be a high hierarchical jump in CEO succession (see, 
details in Appendix A).
Hierarchical Intensity 
According to (Zhu et al., 2016) the hierarchical position among each company’  pr f le
ind cates the authority of the upper hierarc y. So it me ns there must be a rule of se iority
whil  allocating each board member on the hi archical rank. In this scenario, f in ernal 
succession occurs forcefully, then many upper-rank board members are willing to be
preferred via low hi rarchical jumps. The reason behind thi , they have been manoeuvri g for 
the last many years to obtain the top level (Sh n & Cannella Jr, 2002). It has been observed 
that the novel successo  confronts many uncertainties duri g his early stage. The xis ent non 
CEOs (seniors) are the ctual opponents who can aggravate t e already miserable plight. In 
such circumstances, it is significant to analyse the impact of hierarchical jumps in CEO 
succession while exprop ating th  rights of senior board members on fin ial performance 
which has been d fined as hierarchical intensity. Mathematically, it is written as 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 =  (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                                (c) 
(𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = {
𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐻 𝐻
𝐻            𝑜𝑜𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒   , (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = {
𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆  𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻    𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐻 𝐻
𝐻               𝑜𝑜𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒              (d)  
In equation (c)(𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the number of positions in the hiechay which has been 
crossed by the successor and  (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the number of seniors persons crossed which already 
exist at the top ranks. There is a probability that (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is “0”which means that the successor 
himself was the most senior member of the hierarchy (see details in Appendix A).
Control Variables 
As Chinese firms are controlled via strict surveillance of government. This is why we have 
endorsed the most significant control variables (SOE and DUAL) following the extant 
literature (Jiang et al., 2013; Zhu et al., 2016, Shah et al.al 2019, Sarfraz et al.,2019).  It has 
been evaluated that up to 2014 among listed firms on Shenzhen and Shanghai stock 
exchange, only 37.88% were SOE but capturing the 64.36% of market capitalization which 
signifies that most of non-SOE are small firms(Wong, 2016). SOE represents the state-owned 
enterprise which has been assigned while 0, in case of non-SOE.  
According to Chinese corporate structure, the CEO can capture two offices indicating 
the hegemonic and authoritative role which allows him to take decision steadfastly.  In this 
regards, the existing literature(G. Chen, Firth, Gao, & Rui, 2006; Zhang & Qu, 2016)has 
included “Duality” as a dummy variable. Intuitively, it is quite significant to contemplate the 
characteristics of novel successor while being appointed through hierarchical jumps, we have 
included the dummy variables AGE and Degree in regressions following (Jiang et al., 2013; 
Manner, 2010; Zhu et al., 2016). Interestingly, following the new rules promulgated by 
CSRC, listed Chinese company requires a certain number of directors and executive (T. 
Chen, 2015) for enhancing the efficiency of corporate governance. Meanwhile, the positive 
impact of board on firms’ growth has been analyzed by the prior research(Adams, Hermalin, 
& Weisbach, 2010; Jin et al., 2017; Lehn, Patro, & Zhao, 2009)So, following(López Iturriaga 
& Morrós Rodríguez, 2014) the numbers of board of directors are also included in panel 
regression. Lastly, “Firm age” and (since the firm has been listed), “firm size”(taking log of 
total number of employees) “total asset” (taking logarithm) and “leverage” have also been 
included in panel regression following the extant literature(F. Hu & Leung, 2012; Jiang et al., 
2013; Unsal, Hassan, & Zirek, 2016). 
Empirical Models 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                                            (1) 
preferred via lo  hierar hical jumps. The reason behi d this, they have been manoeuvring for 
th  last many years to obtain the top level (Shen & Cannella Jr, 2002). It has been observed 
t at the novel successor confronts many uncertainties during his early stage. The xistent non 
CEOs (seniors) are the actual opponents who ca  aggravate the already miserable plight. I  
such circumstances, it is significa t to analyse the imp ct of hier rchical jumps in CEO 
s cession while xpropriating the rights of senior board members on financial performance 
which has been defined as ierarchical intensity. Mathematically, it is writte  as 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 =  (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                                (c) 
(𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = {
𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐻 𝐻
𝐻            𝑜𝑜𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒   , (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = {
𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆  𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻    𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐻 𝐻
𝐻               𝑜𝑜𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒              (d)  
In equation (c)(𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the number of positions in the hiechay which has been 
crossed by the successor and  (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the number of seniors persons crossed which already 
exist at the top ranks. There is a probability that (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is “0”which means that the successor 
himself was the most senior member of the hierarc y (see details in Appendix A).
Control Variables 
As Chinese firms are controlled via strict surveillance of government. This is why we have 
endorsed the ost significant control variables (SOE and DUAL) following the extant 
literature (Jiang et al., 2013; Zhu et al., 2016, Shah et al.al 2019, Sarfraz et al.,2019).  It has 
be n evaluated th t up to 2014 among listed firms on Shenzhen and Shanghai stock 
exchange, only 37.88% were SOE but capturing the 64.36% of market capitalization whi h 
signifies that most of non-SOE are small firms(Wong, 201 ). SOE represents the state-owned 
enterprise which has bee  assigned while 0, in case of non-SOE.  
According to Chi ese corporate structure, the CEO can capture two offices indicating 
the hegemonic and aut oritative r le which allows him to t ke decision steadfastly.  In this 
regards, the existing literature(G. Chen, Firth, Gao, & Rui, 2006; Zhang & Qu, 2016) as 
inclu ed “Duality” as a dummy variable. Intuitively, it is q ite significant to contemplate the 
characteristics of novel successor while being appointed through hierarchical jumps, we hav  
included the dummy variabl s AGE and De ree in regressi ns following (Jiang et al., 2013; 
Manner, 2010; Zhu et al., 2016). Interestingly, following the new rules promulgated by 
CSRC, listed Chines  company requires a certain number of directors and executive (T. 
hen, 2015) for e hancing the efficiency of corporate governance. Meanwhile, the positive 
impact of board o  firms’ growth has been analyzed by the prior r search(Adams, Hermalin, 
& Weisbach, 2010; Jin et al., 2017; Lehn, P tro, & Zhao, 2009)So, following(López Iturriaga 
 Morrós Rodríguez, 2014) the numbers of board of directors are also includ d in panel 
regression. Lastly, “Firm age” and (since the firm has been listed), “firm size”(taking log of 
total number of employees) “total asset” (taking logarithm) and “leverage” have also been 
included in panel regression following the exta t liter ture(F. Hu & Leung, 2012; Ji ng et al., 
2013; Unsal, Hassan, & Zirek, 2016). 
Empirical Models 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                                            (1) 
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already exist at the top ranks. There is a probability that (NPS) it is “0”which means 
that the successor himself was the most senior member of the hierarchy (see details 
in Appendix A).
Control Variables
As Chinese firms are controlled via strict surveillance of government. This is why 
we have endorsed the most significant control variables (SOE and DUAL) following 
the extant literature (Jiang et al., 2013; Zhu et al., 2016, Shah et al.al 2019, Sarfraz 
et al.,2019).  It has been evaluated that up to 2014 among listed firms on Shenzhen 
and Shanghai stock exchange, only 37.88% were SOE but capturing the 64.36% of 
market capitalization which signifies that most of non-SOE are small firms(Wong, 
2016). SOE represents the state-owned enterprise which has been assigned 1 while 0, 
in case of non-SOE. 
According to Chinese corporate structure, the CEO can capture two offices indi-
cating the hegemonic and authoritative role which allows him to take decision stead-
fastly.  In this regards, the existing literature (G. Chen, Firth, Gao, & Rui, 2006; 
Zhang & Qu, 2016) has included “Duality” as a dummy variable. Intuitively, it is 
quite significant to contemplate the characteristics of novel successor while being 
appointed through hierarchical jumps, we have included the dummy variables AGE 
and Degree in regressions following (Jiang et al., 2013; Manner, 2010; Zhu et al., 
2016). Interestingly, following the new rules promulgated by CSRC, listed Chinese 
company requires a certain number of directors and executive (T. Chen, 2015) for 
enhancing the efficiency of corporate governance. Meanwhile, the positive impact of 
board on firms’ growth has been analyzed by the prior research (Adams, Hermalin, 
& Weisbach, 2010; Jin et al., 2017; Lehn, Patro, & Zhao, 2009) So, following (López 
Iturriaga & Morrós Rodríguez, 2014) the numbers of board of directors are also in-
cluded in panel regression. Lastly, “Firm age”  (since the firm has been listed), “firm 
size” (taking log of total number of employees) “total asset” (taking logarithm) and 
“leverage” have also been included in panel regression following the extant literature 
(F. Hu & Leung, 2012; Jiang et al., 2013; Unsal, Hassan, & Zirek, 2016).
Empirical Models
                                                                                            (1)
(2)
preferred via low hierarchical jumps. The reason behind this, they have been manoeuvring for 
the last many years to obtain the top level (Shen & Cannella Jr, 2002). It has been observed 
that the novel successor confronts many uncertainties during his early stage. The existent non 
CEOs (seniors) are the actual opponents who can aggravate the already miserable plight. In 
such circumstances, it is significant to analyse the impact of hierarchical jumps in CEO 
succession while expropriating the rights of senior board members on financial performance 
which has been defined as hierarchical intensity. Mathematically, it is written as 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 =  (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                                (c) 
(𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = {
𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐻 𝐻
𝐻           𝑜𝑜𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒   , (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = {
𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆  𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻    𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐻 𝐻
𝐻              𝑜𝑜𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒              (d)  
In equation (c)(𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the number of positions in the hiechay which has been 
crossed by the successor and  (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the number of seniors persons crossed which already 
exist at the top ranks. There is a probability that (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is “0”which means that the successor 
himself was the most senior member of the hierarchy (see details in Appendix A).
Control Variables 
As Chinese firms are controlled via stric  surveillance of g vernment. This is why we have 
endorsed the most significant control variables (SOE and DUAL) following the extant 
literature (Jiang et ., 2013; Zhu et al., 2016, Shah et al.al 2019, Sarfraz et al.,2019).  It has 
been evaluated that up to 2014 among listed f rms on Shenzhen and Shanghai stock 
exchange, only 37.88% were SOE but capturing the 64.36% of market capitalization which 
signifies that most of non-SOE are small firms(Wong, 2016). SOE rep sents the state-owned 
enterprise which as bee  assigned wh le 0, in case of non-SOE.  
Accordi g to Chinese corporate structure, the CEO can capture two offices indicating 
the hegemonic and authoritative role which lows him to take decision steadfastly. In this 
regards, th existing literature(G. Chen, Firth, Gao, & Rui, 2006; Zhang & Qu, 2016)has 
included “Duality” as a dummy variable. Intuitively, t is quite significant to contemplate the 
characteristics of novel successor while being ppointed through hiera chical jumps, we have 
included the dummy variables AGE and Deg ee in egressions following (Jiang et al., 2013; 
Manner, 2010; Zhu et al., 2016). Interestingly, f llowing the new rules promulgated by 
CSRC, listed Chin s  company requires a certain number of directors and execu ive (T. 
Chen, 2015) for enhancing t e efficiency of corporat governance. Meanwhile, the positive 
impact of board on firms’ growth has been a alyzed by t e prior research(Adams, Hermalin, 
& Weisbach, 2010; Jin et al., 2017; Lehn, Patro, & Zhao, 2009)So, following(López Iturriaga 
& Morrós Rodríguez, 2014) the numbers of board of directo s are also inclu ed in panel 
regression. Lastly, “Firm age” and (since the firm has been li ted), “firm size”(taking log of 
total numb r of employees) “total asset” (taking logarithm) and “leverage” hav  lso been 
included in panel regression following the extant literature(F. Hu & Leung, 2012; Jiang et al., 
2013; Unsal, Hassan, & Zirek, 2016). 
Empirical Models 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                                            (1) 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                                                    (2) 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                                                                             (3) 
Empirical Results 
Table 1 represents the descriptive statistic of all variables revealing that seven variables are 
dummy variables that’s why the β′s value are small (especially main independent hierarchical 
jumps variable (see Table2, Table3 and Table4). Moreover, “Dual”, “SOE” and “HInt” have 
greater observation (13501, 13642 and 13642 respectively) than other variables. Due to 
missing data, data has been synchronized by using STATA command “merge data”.
Fixed effect panel regression has been preferred (via confirmation of Hausman 
test) The advantage of the fixed effect model is; it also captures the unobservable 
characteristics. The results of first-panel regression are represented by Table2 which 
indicates that hierarchical jumps are positively significant for all models ((1) to (6)). It also 
satisfies the first hypothesis. Moreover, it can be observed that hierarchical jump has 
brought2% increment in the performance which is quite significant not only for the high 
market capitalized firm but also useful for the newly born firms. In all columns “LNTA” 
(Total asset) is highly significant this means higher total assets firms will be more beneficial 
via the hierarchical jump. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistic 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
HJ 12469 0.084209 0.277712 0 1
LHJ 12468 0.029836 0.170143 0 1
HHJ 12465 0.055997 0.231663 0 1
EPS 13479 0.352219 0.775508 -6.85992 42.43205
ROA 13641 0.042034 1.034721 -48.3159 108.3657
ROI 12899 0.28954 0.629251 -0.8384 15.21132
LEV 13640 0.451735 0.634719 0.007969 63.97121
Degree 12470 0.026464 0.160516 0 1
AGE 12470 0.03753 0.190064 0 1
LNTA 13627 22.07624 1.486582 14.94164 30.81489
LNEMP 13636 7.590694 1.373216 1.609438 13.21468
NDIR 13641 8.72546 1.84488 0 22
Dual 13501 0.263166 0.440536 0 1
SOE 13642 0.439012 0.496285 0 1
HInt 13642 6.715877 44.56209 0 961
Table1 represents descriptive statistic indicating that seven variables are dummy 
variables. “HInt” represents the hierarchical intensity whose minimum value is “0” which 
also indicates that in some case the successor him selves was the most senior person. 
Moreover, “NDIR” represents the number of directors.
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(3)
Empirical Results
Table 1 represents the descriptive statistic of all variables revealing that seven vari-
ables are dummy variables that’s why the  value are small (especially main indepen-
dent hierarchical jumps variable (see Table2, Table3 and Table4). Moreover, “Dual”, 
“SOE” and “HInt” have greater observation (13501, 13642 and 13642 respectively) 
than other variables. Due to missing data, data has been synchronized by using STA-
TA command “merge data”.
 Fixed effect panel regression has been preferred (via confirmation of Hausman 
test) The advantage of the fixed effect model is; it also captures the unobservable 
characteristics. The results of first-panel regression are represented by Table2 which 
indicates that hierarchical jumps are positively significant for all models ((1) to (6)). It 
also satisfies the first hypothesis. Moreover, it can be observed that hierarchical jump 
has brought2% increment in the performance which is quite significant not only for 
the high market capitalized firm but also useful for the newly born firms. In all col-
umns “LNTA” (Total asset) is highly significant this means higher total assets firms 
will be more beneficial via the hierarchical jump.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistic
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
HJ 12469 0.084209 0.277712 0 1
LHJ 12468 0.029836 0.170143 0 1
HHJ 12465 0.055997 0.231663 0 1
EPS 13479 0.352219 0.775508 -6.85992 42.43205
ROA 13641 0.042034 1.034721 -48.3159 108.3657
ROI 12899 0.28954 0.629251 -0.8384 15.21132
LEV 13640 0.451735 0.634719 0.007969 63.97121
Degree 12470 0.026464 0.160516 0 1
AGE 12470 0.03753 0.190064 0 1
LNTA 13627 22.07624 1.486582 14.94164 30.81489
LNEMP 13636 7.590694 1.373216 1.609438 13.21468
NDIR 13641 8.72546 1.84488 0 22
Dual 13501 0.263166 0.440536 0 1
SOE 13642 0.439012 0.496285 0 1
HInt 13642 6.715877 44.56209 0 961
Table 1 represents descriptive statistic while indicating that seven variables are 
dummy variables. “HInt” represents the hierarchical intensity whose minimum value 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                                                    (2) 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                                                                             (3) 
Empirical Results 
Table 1 represents the descriptive statistic of all variables revealing that seven variables are 
dummy variables that’s why the β′s value are small (especially main independent hierarchical 
jumps variable (see Table2, Table3 and Table4). Moreover, “Dual”, “SOE” and “HInt” have 
greater observation (13501, 13642 and 13642 respectively) than other variables. Due to 
missing data, data has been synchronized by using STATA command “merge data”.
Fixed effect panel regression has been preferred (via confirmation of Hausman 
test) The advantage of the fixed effect model is; it also captures the unobservable 
characteristics. The results of first-panel regression are represented by Table2 which 
indicates that hierarchical jumps are positively significant for all models ((1) to (6)). It also 
satisfies the first hypothesis. Moreover, it can be observed that hierarchical jump has 
brought2% increment in the performance which is quite significant not only for the high 
market capitalized firm but also useful for the newly born firms. In all columns “LNTA” 
(Total asset) is highly significant this means higher total assets firms will be more beneficial 
via the hierarchical jump. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistic 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
HJ 12469 0.084209 0.277712 0 1
LHJ 12468 0.029836 0.170143 0 1
HHJ 12465 0.055997 0.231663 0 1
EPS 13479 0.352219 0.775508 -6.85992 42.43205
ROA 13641 0.042034 1.034721 -48.3159 108.3657
ROI 12899 0.28954 0.62925 0.8384 15.21132
LEV 13640 0.451735 0.634719 0. 07969 63.97121
Degree 12470 0.026464 0.160516 0 1
AGE 12470 0.03753 0.190064 0 1
LNTA 13627 22.07624 1.486582 14.94164 30.81489
LNEMP 13636 7.590694 1.373216 1.609438 13.21468
NDIR 13641 8.72546 1.84488 0 22
Dual 13501 0.2631 6 0.44053 0 1
SOE 13642 0.439012 0.49628 0 1
HInt 13642 6.715877 44.56209 0 961
Table1 represents descriptive statistic indicating that seven variables are dummy 
variables. “HInt” represents the hierarchical intensity whose minimum value is “0” which 
also indicates that in some case the successor him selves was the most senior person. 
Moreover, “NDIR” represents the number of directors.
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is “0” which also indicates that in some cases the successor him selves was the most 
senior person. Moreover, “NDIR” represents the number of directors.
Table 2: The impact of Hierarchical Jump on Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ROA ROA ROA ROI ROI
HJ 0.0223* 0.0220* 0.0204** 0.109** 0.108**
(0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0104) (0.0488) (0.0487)
EPS 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.132*** -0.00240 -0.00246
(0.00499) (0.00498) (0.00498) (0.0121) (0.0122)
ROIt-1 -0.315*** -0.313***
(0.0138) (0.0141)
ROAt-1 0.0131*** 0.0131*** 0.0131***
(0.00202) (0.00202) (0.00202)
Leverage -0.527*** -0.527*** -0.527*** 0.00975 0.00601
(0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0524) (0.0528)
Degree -0.00571 -0.00537 0.0330 0.0343
(0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0638) (0.0638)
AGE 0.0457*** 0.0452*** 0.0452*** -0.0495 -0.0483
(0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0562) (0.0559)
LNTA 0.00647** 0.00652** 0.00648** 0.0478*** 0.0466***
(0.00301) (0.00301) (0.00301) (0.0123) (0.0124)
LNEMP 0.000583 -0.0327**
(0.00342) (0.0140)
Dual -0.00211 -0.00222 -0.00212 -0.0369 -0.0343
(0.00717) (0.00717) (0.00716) (0.0331) (0.0331)
SOE -0.00919 -0.00941 -0.00929 0.0142 0.0158
(0.00951) (0.00951) (0.00950) (0.0297) (0.0297)
NDIR -0.00118
(0.00142)
Constant 0.0818 0.0930 0.0861 -0.393 -0.616**
(0.0705) (0.0672) (0.0667) (0.287) (0.270)
Observations 9,582 9,586 9,586 8,882 8,885
R-squared 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.099 0.098
Number of companies 2,787 2,787 2,787 2,579 2,579
Table 2 indicates that hierarchical jumps for both ROA and ROI are positively 
significant.
Additionally, LNTA (log of total assets) is significant, but NDIR (number of direc-
tors) has remained insignificant.
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Table 3: The impact of Low and High hierarchical Jump on Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ROA ROA ROA ROI ROI ROI
LHJ 0.00858 0.00861 0.00818 -0.00701 -0.00798 -0.0114
(0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0491) (0.0491) (0.0432)
HHJ 0.0183* 0.0182* 0.0172* 0.0934** 0.0925** 0.0897***
(0.0101) (0.0101) (0.00997) (0.0387) (0.0386) (0.0337)
EPS 0.0845*** 0.0844*** 0.0844*** -0.00540 -0.00546 -0.00545
(0.00303) (0.00303) (0.00301) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0114)
Leverage -0.233*** -0.233*** -0.233*** -0.00607 -0.00412 -0.00411
(0.00748) (0.00748) (0.00739) (0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0280)
AGE -0.0398*** -0.0393*** -0.0388*** -0.00775 -0.00686
(0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0121) (0.0468) (0.0468)
Degree 0.000510 0.000778 0.00113 0.000902 0.00176 0.00225
(0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0134) (0.0516) (0.0516) (0.0515)
LNTA 0.000428 0.000306 0.000562 0.0408*** 0.0399*** 0.0399***
(0.00239) (0.00238) (0.00236) (0.00913) (0.00911) (0.00911)
LNEMP -0.00338 -0.00327 -0.0170*
(0.00253) (0.00248) (0.00971)
Dual -0.00138 -0.00112 -0.0169 -0.0152 -0.0153
(0.00563) (0.00563) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219)
SOE -0.00343 -0.00319 -0.00367 -0.00395 -0.00261 -0.00250
(0.00698) (0.00698) (0.00685) (0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0265)
NDIR -0.00111 -0.00267 -0.00268
(0.00109) (0.00418) (0.00418)
Constant 0.128** 0.112** 0.124** -0.470** -0.565*** -0.565***
(0.0552) (0.0530) (0.0544) (0.211) (0.203) (0.203)
Observations 12,180 12,186 12,311 11,566 11,572 11,572
R-squared 0.177 0.177 0.178 0.004 0.003 0.003
Number of 
companies
2,928 2,928 2,933 2,837 2,837 2,837
Table3 has revealed that High hierarchical jump is significant while the low hier-
archical jump is insignificant. The results are robust.
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Table 4: The impact of Low and High hierarchical Jump on Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES ROA ROA ROA ROI ROI ROI ROI
HInt 8.72e-05* 8.64e-05* 8.72e-05* 0.000345* 0.000347* 0.000281* 0.000290*
(4.95e-05) (4.94e-05) (4.95e-05) (0.000182) (0.000182) (0.000154) (0.000153)
ROIt-1 -0.314*** -0.312***
(0.0121) (0.0121)
ROAt-1 -0.0131*** -0.0131*** -0.0131***
(0.00202) (0.00202) (0.00202)
EPS 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.132*** -0.00213 -0.00210 -0.00547 -0.00545
(0.00499) (0.00498) (0.00499) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0114) (0.0114)
Leverage -0.527*** -0.527*** -0.527*** 0.00944 0.00585 -0.00256 -0.00511
(0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0613) (0.0613) (0.0280) (0.0280)
Degree 0.00636 0.00660 0.00636 0.0955* 0.0954* 0.0293
(0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0552) (0.0552) (0.0460)
AGE -0.0348*** -0.0345*** -0.0348*** 0.00862 0.00867 0.0121 0.0184
(0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0471) (0.0471) (0.0396) (0.0385)
Dual -0.00185 -0.00201 -0.00185 -0.0361 -0.0318 -0.0102 -0.0159
(0.00718) (0.00720) (0.00718) (0.0272) (0.0273) (0.0220) (0.0219)
SOE -0.00923 -0.00924 -0.00923 0.0140 0.0155 -0.00319 -0.00401
(0.00951) (0.00951) (0.00951) (0.0351) (0.0351) (0.0265) (0.0265)
LNTA 0.00645** 0.00645** 0.00645** 0.0476*** 0.0464*** 0.0396*** 0.0406***
(0.00301) (0.00301) (0.00301) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.00911) (0.00913)
LNEMP 0.000647 0.000647 -0.0324** -0.0171*
(0.00342) (0.00342) (0.0128) (0.00971)
NDIR -0.000330 0.00510 0.00889
(0.00208) (0.00784) (0.00620)
Constant 0.0824 0.0902 0.0824 -0.387 -0.653** -0.653*** -0.465**
(0.0705) (0.0693) (0.0705) (0.264) (0.259) (0.209) (0.211)
Observations 9,584 9,588 9,584 8,884 8,887 11,578 11,572
R-squared 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.099 0.098 0.003 0.003
Number of 
company
2,788 2,788 2,788 2,580 2,580 2,839 2,839
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4 indicates that hierarchical intensity is positively significant for both ROI 
and ROA. Additionally, LNTA is significant with a positive sign for all types of mod-
els. Table 3 has revealed that upper jump has unquestionably boosted the firm’s per-
formance clarifying second assumption H2. Significantly, the high hierarchical jump 
has enhanced the return on an asset by almost 1.8% whereas it has also enhanced the 
return on investment almost 9 %. Finally, this model is also robust. The results of ta-
ble4 support the third hypothesis H3 in which hierarchical intensity is positively sig-
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nificant for financial performance. It can be observed that the values of the coefficient 
are small for each model. The reason behind this is due to the interaction term (num-
ber of rank in hierarchy* the number of senior officials crossed) which illustrates that 
during some hierarchical jumps during hierarchical jumps the successor himself was 
the most senior person. So, in this case, a zero value has been allocated. In this model, 
the “total assets” has shown positive signs which shows that more prominent firms 
can enhance their growth through hierarchical jumps vigorously.
Robustness Check
The threat of endogeneity has been removed by applying instrumental 2sls regression 
technique.  Following the extant literature (Shah et al., 2019 and Sarfraz et al., 2019), 
we have endorsed “THPOS” (total hierarchical position) as an instrumental variable 
which satisfies the conditions of correlation (see table 5). In table 5 the last row clar-
ifies that total hierarchical positions (THPOS) are 70% related with “HJ” while with 
the performance it is only related .03and 3 % only which authenticates its reliability.
Table 6 indicates that results are reliable and without any concern of endogeneity. 
It can be judged that results in this table are almost the same verifying the authen-
ticity of the previous results. Clearly, “HJ” and “HHJ” are highly significant as com-
pared to previous results. Conclusively, the results of table 5, evaluate that hierarchi-
cal jumps are necessary for the financial growth of the firms especially it enhance 
the return on assets up to 50%. Comprehensively, high hierarchical jumps are a better 
choice for enhancing financial growth. Lastly, the hierarchical intensity is also high-
ly significant which illustrate that even if senior board members are neglect during 
hierarchical jumps, but the momentum of financial performance remains undeterred.
Table 5: Correlation Matrix of Instrumental Variable
ROI ROA HJ THPOS
ROA 1.0000
ROI -0.0035 1.0000
HJ 0.0034 0.0205 1.0000
THPOS 0.0032 0.0316 0.7011 1.0000
Correlation matrix indicates the authenticity of instrumental variable
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Table 6: Instrumental Regression (2sls)
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)
VARIABLES ROA ROI ROA ROI ROA ROI
Fage -0.418*** -0.00749 -0.411*** 0.00456 -0.413*** -0.0103





LNTA 0.362*** 0.00467 0.346*** -0.00690 0.347*** 0.00139
(0.0817) (0.00718) (0.0771) (0.0203) (0.0776) (0.0133)
LNEMP 0.159*** -0.0159*** 0.138*** -0.0211** 0.142*** -0.0158**
(0.0420) (0.00559) (0.0383) (0.00941) (0.0390) (0.00725)
Degree -0.494** -0.0107 -0.447** 0.00602 -0.259 0.0762*
(0.213) (0.0429) (0.204) (0.0473) (0.172) (0.0454)
AGE -0.0662 -0.0343 0.00464 -0.0266 0.187 -0.0230
(0.172) (0.0392) (0.169) (0.0393) (0.148) (0.0388)
Dual -0.649*** 0.00980 -0.567*** 0.0292 -0.566*** 0.00865
(0.152) (0.0167) (0.135) (0.0348) (0.135) (0.0260)
NDIR 0.125*** -0.00175 0.125***
(0.0288) (0.00828) (0.0290)
SOE 1.578*** -0.0312 1.521*** -0.0734 1.524*** -0.0394









Constant -5.582*** 0.404*** -5.947*** 0.600 -5.965*** 0.566**
(1.342) (0.128) (1.390) (0.370) (1.400) (0.228)
Observations 12,185 11,571 12,184 11,570 12,187 8,885
Table 6 has revealed that results are reliable due to the removal of endogeneity. 
The first two columns indicate hierarchical jump “HJ” is highly significant. Addi-
tionally, column 3rd and 4th have supported the second assumption (high hierarchi-
cal jump boost the firms; growth). Moreover, the last two columns have revealed that 
hierarchical intensity “HInt” is also highly significant. 
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Conclusion
Chinese companies are alleged to be strictly controlled via severe government own-
ership. Even some extant literature has evaluated that the incumbent CEOs have 
strong ties with political lobbying which is why there can be a high rate of hierarchi-
cal jumps (especially among SOEs). Despite mentioned above, the hierarchical jumps 
are inevitable for the enhancement of firms ‘growth. Moreover, the appointment of 
CEO via high hierarchical jump must be preferred rather than any other category of 
succession. It also concludes that CEO’s himself/herself responsible for being turned 
over forcefully because of his/her poor performance. 
To encapsulate, while selecting the CEOs via hierarchical jumps, the following 
rules are necessary. First of all, he or she must be chosen among the low hierarchical 
rank. Secondly, no significance should be given to educational background or age of 
the novel appointee successor via hierarchical jumps. Lastly, it has also been suggest-
ed that while appointing CEO via high hierarchical jump, the senior board members 
should not be ignored otherwise the enhancement in the firms’ performance will be 
minor.
Limitations
Firstly, the study has analysed the hierarchical jump occurring via internal succes-
sion, but performance-based hierarchical jumps among board members need to be 
explored for future study. Secondly, hierarchical jumps have been categorized into 
high level and low level. Future research can contemplate middle-level hierarchical 
jumps influencing the financial performance. Lastly, this study has evaluated the ef-
fect of hierarchical jump on firm’s performance only. It would be interesting to anal-
yse the impact of hierarchical jumps on the other attributes of firms.
NOTES
1 In some Chinese firms the list of independent directors is not according to hierarchical rank (Zhu et 
al., 2016).
2 Zhu et al., 2016 have analyzed that 90% of firms allocate vice chairman above the independent direc-
tors. So, it means, few firms have not allocated the board members according to proper seniority level.
3 According to CSMAR (Chinese Stock Market and Accounting Research), there are 12 categories 
for the turnover of top management (rotation, retirement, expiration of the term, change of ownership, 
resignation, fire, health, personal reasons, improvement of corporate governance, criminalities, the end 
of the temporary appointment and natural turnover.
4 SOE at central government is under the surveillance of Central Departments of Organization of Com-
munist party of China which is responsible for appointing CEO (Jiang.Fet al. 2013).
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Appendix
This table has selected only one listed company (stock code 000688) for the years 
2015-2016 in table 6. 
Table 6: How to Formulate Hierarchical Jumps and Hierarchical Intensity
Company 
code year Name Designation Age Education
Succession 
type
000688 2015 刘建民 Chairman(CEO) 63  Engineering
000688 2015 杜俊魁 (du Zun) Deputy Chairman 60 Economics
000688 2015 董剑平 Deputy Chairman 48 Advanced Economics
000688 2015 刘榕 Director 30
000688 2015 张广龙 Director 48
000688 2015 赵威 (Zhao Wei) Director 50 Advanced Engineering
000688 2015 姚新华 Independent Director 59 Lawyer
000688 2015 冉来明 Independent Director 54
000688 2015 郭喜明 Independent Director 47
000688 2015 陈洁 Supervisor (who can chair the meeting) 52
000688 2015 马慧 Supervisor 31
000688 2015 王世鹏 Staff supervisor 35
000688 2015 蔡亮 General Manager 46 Engineering
000688 2015 夏勇 General Manager 48
000688 2015 熊为民 Deputy GM 53
000688 2015 菅玉荣 Deputy GM 51 Advanced Engineering
000688 2015 吴斌鸿 Inspector General for Finance Affair 47
000688 2015 张健 Director 39
000688 2015 杜寒阳 Supervisor 31
000688 2016 赵威 (Zhao Wei) Chairman (CEO) 51 Advanced Engineering 1= internal succession
000688 2016 杜俊魁 Deputy Chairman 61 Economics
000688 2016 董剑平 Deputy Chairman 49
000688 2016 刘榕 Director 31
000688 2016 张广龙 Director 49            
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This table indicates the firm (stock code 000688) for the 2015-2016 in which 
hierarchical jumps is occurred. As “Zhao Wei” is a director having a 6th position 
in the rank in 2015. However, when succession occurs, he has been appointed as a 
Chairman (CEO). He has crossed one senior person (vice Chairman Mr. Du Zun in 
2nd place in the hierarchy).
Mathematical Formulas are explained as follows
In this table “ML”  is  9.5 (as total numbers of officials are 19) and “nPR” is 6 (Zhao 
Wei has been elevated from the 6th position). So, it is a low hierarchical jump and 
its value is “1”.  Similarly, high jump can be analyzed (In this case high hierarchical 









000688 2016 张广龙 Director 49
This table indicates the firm (stock code 000688) for the 2015-2016 in which 
hierarchical jumps is occurred. As “Zhao Wei” is a director having a 6th position in the rank 
in 2015. However, when succession occurs, he has been appointed as Chairman (CEO). He 
has crossed one senior person (vice Chairman Mr. Du Zun in 2ndplace in the hierarchy). 
Mathematical Formulas are explained as follows 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = {
1               𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    0 < 𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠, 𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅 < 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿
0                                 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
In this table “ ML" is  9.5 (as total numbers of officials are 19) and “npR” is  6 (Zhao 
Wei has been elevated from the 6th p sition). So, it is a low hierarchical jump and its value is 
“1”.  Simi arly, igh jump can be analyzed (In this case igh hierar hical jump is “0”). 
HJit+1 = ∑ LHJit + HHJit= 1+0=1 (which means hierarchical jumps is 1). Importantly, 
hierarchical jump is either low hierarchical or high hierarchical. 
Additionally, hierarchical intensity can be analyzed as follows
𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 =  (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = {
𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿        𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 0
0            𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒    , (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = {
𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆       𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 0
0               𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
In this table "(𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖"=6 (where 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿 means total number ofthe  position in 
hierarchy whichis also 6) and “(𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖” = 1 ( where  𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 represents the total number of 
seniors are crossed as “Zhao Wei” has expropriated the right of only one senior person “Du 
Zun” whose age is 60).  So, in this case “𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1"= 6*1=6.
 = (which means hiera chical jumps is 1). 
Importantly, hierarchical jump is either low hierarchical or high hierarchical.
Additionally, hierarchical intensity can be analyzed as follows
In this table “(NPH)it” = 6 (where TNPH means total number ofthe  position in 
hierarchy whichis also 6) and “(NPS)it” = 1 (where TNPS represents the total number 
of seniors are crossed as “Zhao Wei” has expropriated the right of only one senior 
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This t ble indicates the firm (stock code 000688) for the 2015-2016 in which 
hierarchical jumps is occurred. As “Zhao Wei” is a director having a 6th positio  in the rank 
in 2015. However, when succession occurs, he has b en appointed as Chairman (CEO). He 
has crossed one senior p rson (vice Chairman Mr. Du Zun in 2ndplace in the hierarchy). 
Mathem tical Formulas are explained as follows 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = {
1               𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    0 < 𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠, 𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅 < 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿
0                                 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
In this table “ ML" is  9.5 (as total numbers of officials are 19) and “npR” is  6 (Zhao 
Wei has been elevated from the 6th position). So, it is a low hierarchical jump and its value is 
“1”.  Similarly, high jump can be analyzed (In this case high hierarchical jump is “0”). 
HJit+1 = ∑ LHJi + HHJit= 1+0=1 (which means hierarchical jumps is 1). Importantly, 
hierarchical jump is either low hierarchical or high hi rarchical. 
Additionally, hierarchical intensity can be analyzed as follows
𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 =  (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = {
𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿        𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 0
0            𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒    , (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = {
𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆       𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 0
0               𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
In this table "(𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖"=6 (where 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿 me ns total numb r ofthe  position in 
hierarchy whichis also 6) and “(𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖” = 1 ( where  𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 represents the total number of 
seniors are crossed as “Zhao Wei” has expropriated the right of only one senior person “Du 
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This table indicates the firm (stock code 000688) for the 2015-2016 in which 
hierarchical jumps is occurred. As “Zhao Wei” is a director having a 6th position in the rank 
in 2015. However, wh n suc essi n occur , he has be n appoin ed a  Chairman (CEO). He 
has crossed one senior person (vi e Chairman Mr. Du Zun i 2ndplace in the hierarchy). 
Mathematical F rm las ar  explained as follows 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = {
1               𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    0 < 𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠, 𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅 < 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿
0                                 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
In this table “ ML" is  9.5 (as total numbers of officials are 19) and “npR” is  6 (Zhao 
Wei has been elevated from the 6th position). So, it is a low hierarchical jump and its value is 
“1”.  Similarly, high jump can be analyzed (In this case high hierarchical jump is “0”). 
HJit+1 = ∑ LHJit + HHJit= 1+0=1 (which means ierarchical jumps is 1). Importantly, 
hierarchical jump is ither low hierarc ical or high hierarchi al. 
Additional y, hierar ical intensity an be analyzed a  follows
𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 =  (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = {
𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿        𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 0
0            𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒    , (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = {
𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆       𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 0
0               𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
In this table "(𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖"=6 (where 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿 means total n er ofthe  position in 
hierarchy whichis also 6) and “(𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖” = 1 ( where  𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 represents the total number of 
seniors are crossed as “Zhao Wei” has expropriated the right of only one senior person “Du 
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This table indicates t  fir  (stock code 00688) for the 2 5-2016 in which 
hierarc ical jumps is occurred. As “Zhao Wei” is a director having a 6th position in the rank 
in 2015. However, when succession occurs, he has been appointed as Chairman (CEO). He 
has crossed one senior person (vice Chairman Mr. Du Zun in 2ndplace in the hierarchy). 
Mathematical Formulas are explained as follows 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = {
1               𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    < 𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠, 𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅 < 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿
0                                 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
In this table “ ML" is  9.5 (as total numbers of officials are 19) and “npR” is  6 (Zhao 
Wei has been elevated from the 6th position). So, it is a low hierarchical jump and its value is 
“1”.  Similarly, high ju p can be analyzed (In this case high hi rar ical jump is “0”). 
HJit+1 = ∑ LHJit + HJit  1+0=1 (which means erarchical jumps is 1). Importantly, 
hierarchical jump is either low hierarchical or high hierar hical. 
Additionally, hiera chical intensity can be analyzed as follows
𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 =  (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = {
𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿        𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 >
0            𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒    , (𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = {
𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆       𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 0
0               𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
In t is table "(𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖"=6 (where 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿 means total number ofthe  position in 
hierarchy whichi lso 6) an  “(𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖” = 1 ( where  𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 represents the total umber of 
seniors are crossed as “Zhao Wei” has expropriated the right of only one senior person “Du 
Zun” whose age is 60).  So, in this case “𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1"= 6*1=6.

